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MEDICAL PRIVACY AND MEDICAL RESEARCH:
IS GOVERNMENT THE PROBLEM OR THE
SOLUTION?
James T. O'Reilly*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Privacy rights in personal medical files are under increasing strain
as government expands its need for the official scrutiny of patient care
records. Government is now auditor, researcher, financial partner, or
provider of medical care for millions of Americans. As a nation, we
offer the appearance of privacy for the individual's medical records, but
we lack the coherent quality of privacy protection which must exist
before the appearance of confidentiality can become a reality.
Individual privacy rights reflect the good intentions of our legal
system toward personal control of personal medical records, but the
performance of our federal privacy protection mechanisms has failed to
carry out those noble intentions. In the decade since the Watergate
scandal and the reform of our information and privacy laws, the performance of these laws has fallen short of our expectations. They have
proven to be a poorly conceived set of rigid and evasion-prone legislative solutions. The good intentions of these laws have been lost in the
daily operation of the bureaucratic state.
The good intentions which followed the Watergate bugging and
surveillance scandal produced no consistent federal reform of the rights
of the individual against federal, state, local, and private sector invasions of privacy. The arcane red tape of the Privacy Act of 1974,1 the
proceduralism of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) amendLecturer in Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; corporate practice, Cincinnati,
Ohio. B.A., Boston College (1969); J.D., University of Virginia (1974). This paper is derived from
an address to the March, 1986, Conference on Privacy and Medical Records Data Sharing, sponsored by the Proprietary Association, in Washington D.C. The views expressed are those of the
author alone.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 &
Supp. 1II 1985)).
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mentS2 of the same year, and a number of convoluted disclosure and
privacy provisions in health and educational records statutes3 were enacted to protect a particularly sensitive population-the recipients of
4
medical care. But if the great expectations which followed Watergate
are seen in retrospective since 1974, we failed to accomplish what we
expected.
This article studies the legislative protection of individual medical
records and the impacts of that protection on the medical research
needs of today's epidemiology research community. Epidemiology, the
study of disease patterns as a means of studying disease causation, is
adversely affected when the privacy protection system overprotects documentation needed for research. The happy medium between effective
privacy rights and effective medical research may come from a revision
of our federal legislative system for medical records handling.
As a first premise, legislation affecting medical records should protect the legitimate interests of the medical patients whose records are
sought to be used in the government or the private sector as a basis for
conclusions regarding disease causation or treatment. Many important
public health decisions involving cancer, new medical technologies, and
product safety are generally premised upon data derived from patient
medical records.
This article examines the competing interests in privacy and disclosure. It will discuss the context of the information law debate, focusing on the problems which scholars of privacy and information law perceive today. Next, it will offer an analytical framework for use in the
disclosure of records under the federal laws governing information and
disclosure. Then it will analyze the significance of a few of the cases.
Finally, it will address the specific issue of privacy for medical patients

2. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985)). The passage of the extensive amendments to the FOIA
immediately preceded the adoption of the Privacy Act by the same Congress. See id.; 5 U.S.C. §
552a (1982 & Supp. II1 1985).
3. E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(4) (1982); Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1982 & Supp. Iii 1985).
4. After news coverage of the Watergate scandal led to revelations of the improper use of
information by federal officials, much of the legislative debate over the Privacy Act related to the
abuses of federal inf6rmation by federal agencies. See SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PRIVACY ACT 826 (Comm. Print 1976). Senator
Edmund Muskie, during the August 20, 1974, markup of the Privacy Act, expressed a "vague
kind of fear about central computer records on individual citizens." !d. at 55. A chronology of the
interest in privacy legislation and the abuses of personal privacy uncovered by the post-Watergate
investigations is found in L. SOBEL, WAR ON PRIVACY (1976). The constituency for privacy legislation did, however, predate the Watergate revelations of 1974. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
HEALTH. EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS. COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF
ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973); A.

THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE

WESTIN, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
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whose adverse drug reactions are increasingly important to public
health studies.
II.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Medical records privacy is best studied within the context of
American information law as a whole. That segment of statute-derived
administrative law of the last two decades has been founded upon an
erroneous but understandable assumption. The privacy and information
disclosure issues came to Congress amid great conflict. 8 Congress had
assumed that the conflicts could be resolved with omnibus solutions of
privacy or information problems detailed in multiple subsections and
exceptions within a complex statute to be effective across the wide variety of situations applicable in today's information society. Having begun with that assumption, Congress has not performed the serious task
of supervising, funding, explaining, and revising these laws. Congress
declared that the battle was won with the passage of legislation but the
change Congress sought has occurred only slowly and reluctantly.
As a result, the calculation of a medical record's legal status requires consideration of the vague privacy exemption for government
disclosures of government files in the FOIA,' a variety of state disclosure laws governing hospital and outpatient records,7 and a Privacy Act
controlling the same issue of disclosures for a smaller set of federal
files." Researching the question of medical patient records control has
become a journey through an uncertain world of legislative conflicts,
traps, and gaps.
5. Conflicts over information policy in several United States Supreme Court cases led to the
FOIA reform measures. See generally SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOV'T INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATION & SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST

SEss.

FREEDOM OF INFORMA-

1974 (P.L. 93-502) (Joint Comm. Print 1975). Personal privacy
abuses led to the enactment of the Privacy Act. See L. SOBEL, supra note 4.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West Supp. 1987) (patients' bill of rights). See
generally R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 1978-79, at 11 (1979)
(compilation of state medical-records privacy statutes).
8. The class of files covered by the Privacy Act of 1974 is limited to those which are in the
control of a federal agency, are retrieved by the name or personal identifier of an individual, and
are not exempted from coverage by the Act's exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(l)-(5), (j), (k)
TION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF

(1982); see also OFFICE OF
(1975), reprinted in SENATE

TION AND INDIVIDUAL

MANAGEMENT

AND BUDGET. PRIVACY

ACT GUIDELINES

COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS & SUBCOMM. ON

GOV'T

1020-23
INFORMA-

RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATION, 94TH CONG., 2D

1974 S. 3418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579) (Joint
Comm.. Print 1976) (Office of Management and Budget adopts these limitations as its principal
interpretation of the Privacy Act). For a discussion of the problems of implementation of the
SESS.. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF

Privacy Act, see Belair, Agency Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act: Impact on the Government's Collection, Maintenance and Dissemination of Personally
Identifiable
Information, 1986
10 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRoc. 465 (1977).
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A symptom of our nation's disorganized approach to personal privacy is the 1974 enactment of both a federal disclosure law9 and a
federal privacy law affecting the same documents but containing uncoordinated and somewhat conflicting terms. 10 It took Congress a dozen
years to recognize that one statute was mandatory, the other discretionary, and that the two had not been designed to complement each other.
Agencies began to claim that exceptions to one statute overrode the
mandatory aspects of the other, resulting in new and unpredictable exemptions." It was necessary, ultimately, to amend the Privacy Act to
correct the error and to accommodate the two conflicting statutes,' 2
after each had been litigated at several different courts with a variety
of different results.'
An important reality is that our system really does not provide
much in the way of systemic protection for the individual. Individual
citizens must wait until the privacy loss occurs and then fight, after the
fact, about how much damage has been done.' 4 The system fails to
encourage the holders of documents to safeguard their secrecy. The
ideal of privacy protections built into our system has been sidetracked
because federal agencies are short of resources. The resulting miscommunication has occurred in an environment of less perceptible public
attention to individual privacy rights. In recent years privacy concerns
have not stirred enough political interest to motivate the passage of
serious legislative revisions to the Privacy Act.' The year 1984 stirred

9. See supra notes 1-2.
10. Compare Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding that material exempted under the Privacy Act is not per se unavailable under FOIA)
with Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that material exempted under the
Privacy Act is unavailable under FOIA). See also Note, Is the Privacy Act an Exemption 3
Statute and Whose Statute Is It Any Way?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1334 (1984); Note, Privacy
Act Exemption (j)(2) Does Not Specifically Preclude Disclosure of Information Within Meaning
of Exemption (3) of the Freedom of Information Act-Greentree v. United States Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 56 TEMP. L.Q. 127 (1983).
11. See supra note 10.
12. Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209,
2211-12 (1984) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q)(2) (Supp. I1 1985)).
13. See supra note 10.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1982) (civil remedies for violation of Privacy Act). Damages may
only be obtained when the violation of the Privacy Act is intention or willful. Id. § 552a(g)(4).
See also infra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of state remedies applicable to
private sector abuses of information.
15. The Privacy Protection Study Commission made detailed recommendations for alteration of the Privacy Act to expand its protection of individuals. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMM., PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 497-536 (1977) [hereinafter PPSCJ.
Bills to implement these recommendations, however, failed to pass. See, e.g. H.R. 5646, 95th
Cong., IstSess. (1977); S. 1928, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Nevertheless, some of the Commission's recommendations were adopted voluntarily. See Bassett & Moran, "Breaking Away": Imhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
plementing the Privacy Commission's Insurance Recommendations, 16 FORUM 587 (1981).
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some passions because of its connection with the literary treatment of
privacy invasion in the book 1984, but legislative action responds best
to crisis, and privacy has been relegated to the back burner of legislative apathy. Relatively little has been accomplished to improve the system's protection of individual privacy.
III.

INITIAL REMEDIES

The condition of United States privacy law in its historical patterns can be analogized to the experience of the Marquess of Queensberry, who drafted the landmark rules of pugilistics in 1867 to outlaw
bare-knuckles boxing. 16 The idealistic Marquess tried to civilize a
rather basic human pattern of conflict. But he discovered that there
would be some difficulty in structuring the patterns of individual conduct so that a socially acceptable sport could be derived from the ancient propensity for combat by brute force.
Our current resolution of the conflict of interests surrounding personal privacy law is today's equivalent of the fistfight stage in the
evolution of boxing. We talk a lot about more sensitive policies for data
handling. Society, however, is unwilling to pay for anything beyond today's haphazard system, which compels one to fight for privacy as a
matter of court awarded damages, rather than to have government provide some protections.1" Our system is irregular, unpredictable, and
costly for the citizen who pays the legal bills for the ostensible protection which private litigation offers only after the privacy injury has
been inflicted.

We could learn much from the nations which de-emphasize litigation and encourage systemic protection of personal rights. Other national systems seem to be more rational and protective. With the exception of a dispute over a Swedish study of medical care for a group of
patients, which when its privacy loss implications were revealed became

16. The Marquess of Queensberry contributed his personal prestige and guidance to the
sport and earned fame from the adoption of his more civilized system. J. CUDDON, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF SPORTS & GAMES 624 (1980); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD
SPORTS & GAMES 111-12 (J. Arlott ed. 1975).
17. Canada has recognized that a social cost of computer efficiency is the easy invasion of
personal privacy rights. "In short, privacy could be the victim of efficiency ....
Now there is the
potential of an ominous shift in the delicate balance of power between the individual and the state;
a shift to the side of the custodians of these great reservoirs of instantly-retrievable, personal
information." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA 1984-85, at 3
(1985). Affirmative governmental protection of privacy, as in the Canadian system, requires a
more effective oversight of the creation and maintenance of private data banks concerning individuals. The Canadian system, like those in England and Sweden, offers a model which has been
discussed but never proposed for serious legislative consideration in the United States, perhaps
because of the lack of a political constituency favoring expenditure of government funds to limit
the private
collection of 1986
data.
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a source of great controversy in Sweden, 18 affirmative privacy protection systems in Europe appear to have worked well. There is a more

rational approach in the nations which systematically protect medical
records and other forms of patient-identified privacy information. 9
In the current wave of cross-checking computer data files, the census and tax records have already lost some of their secrecy. Data sharing policies will cause the expansion of the familiar statutory phrase,
"confidential except for. . . ." A variety of statutory purposes for data
sharing will be expanded to meet the agencies' current needs. Examina-

tion of public records of small business operators, individual business
and professional people, and the like is becoming more common, since
disclosures of the files about these classes of personal activity are not
covered by the Privacy Act.2 0
IV.

ABSENCE OF SYSTEMIC SAFEGUARDS

Who is in charge of privacy protection? The United States has no
one to claim the title. We have declined to create a privacy chief, a
leader of the privacy field, as other nations have.21 Our rules have developed not from a central system of information law interpretations
but from the judicial construction of rather convoluted statutes. When
Congress passed the Privacy Act in haste at the end of its 1974 session,
it could not agree on whether to create a privacy coordinator, nor has
the idea gained political support since that time in a budget-conscious

18. Even in the most centralized privacy systems, there will be an irreducible number of
invasions of personal privacy because of the human ability to devise evasions. Sweden's scandal
arose from the monitoring of medical records of individuals without their consent. Lelyveld, Worried Swedes Questioning Wide Reach of Researchers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
19. For example, privacy protection is accorded to health care information in the evidentiary privilege context in virtually all jurisdictions. See R. SMITH, supra note 7, at 10; Annotation,
Physician-PatientPrivilege as Extending to Patient's Medical or Hospital Records, 10 A.L.R.
4TH

552 (1981).

20. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(c)(3) (1986) (permitting unions to review the medical records of
their members which are held in employer files, without the consent or knowledge of the employees). Access to employee medical records is also provided for in some union contracts.
21. E.g., Lelyveld, supra note 18 (describing Sweden's Data Inspection Board which controls the nongovernmental use of data banks in that nation); see General Motors Corp. v. Director
of the Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, 636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 877 (1981). This case involved a federal agency's response to a union request for a study
of worker health. The federal agency requested access to medical records, and the employer polled
the workers. Access was denied by the employer to the medical records of those who did not
consent to the disclosure. The government overrode that individual decision and forced the employer to disclose all the medical records. Similar results of NIOSH medical records requests
occurred in United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Lasco Indus., 531 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wisc. 1980); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F.
Supp. 821 (S.D.W. Va. 1977).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
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Congress.2 Our approach to privacy rights has been to build few statutory systems while allowing the civil damages powers of the courts to
determine who receives privacy rights and when they are received.
The labor relations field is not a particularly sensitive forum for
assessment of how individual interests can be protected. Because of the
collective nature of the union bargaining process, relatively few rights
of the individual are left alone. In this field as with others, the United
States tends to give only lip service to the ideal of personal consent to
examination of medical records by other private or governmental reviewers. As part of recent labor relations adjudications and OSHA decisions, a union today has broad rights of access to individuals' medical
records, enjoying a legal presumption of access even if employees individually object to such access." A government agency responding to a
union's request for studies of worker health can subpoena the health
records of employees if the employer has retained such files, and individual workers lack veto power over the disclosure of their records to
24
federal officials.
Why civil damages instead of systemic protections? The suggestion that the United States needs privacy rules and the analogy to the
Marquess of Queensberry experience reflects the conflict of adversaries
in which information is a weapon. There is a basic human desire for
success in the fight with other persons for economic, personal, or political advantage. Personal information is used in fighting for one's economic or civil rights, or in the support or defense of charges that discrimination has occurred. It is used when labor unions, insurance firms,
or product marketers are fighting for the additional market share
which comes with signing up more clients, or fighting a tough election
or sales campaign.
Are damages an effective remedy? We offer the person who has
been offended by a privacy invasion a system of statutory rights based
on the ability to sue and win damage awards after an improper disclosure has occurred.2 5 State law governs, and state tort law (absent statu22. Privacy authority in a central agency was recommended by the Privacy Protection
Study Commission. PPSC, supra note 15, at 37. Such a body would issue interpretive rules, monitor federal and nonfederal activities, research privacy issues, and educate government officials
regarding privacy. Id. By contrast to our inactivity, Sweden's Data Inspection Board has been in
place for a dozen years. Lelyveld, supra note 18.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1986); see also Louisiana Chemical Ass'n v. Bingham, 550 F.
Supp. 1136 (W.D. La. 1982).
24. See General Motors Corp., 636 F.2d at 163. See also supra note 23.

25. It is conceivable that one could win a tort action for improper dissemination of personal
information compiled in a private data bank. See Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 217
Kan. 438, 536 P.2d 1358 (1975); Annotation, Exchange Among Insurers of Medical Information
Invasion of Privacy, 98 A.L.R. 3D 561 (1980).
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Insured or Applicant
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tory modification) is not likely to be effective for the individual vindica6
tion of the right to preserve the privacy of health-related information.
Our Privacy Act permits civil damage awards but not injunctions
against violations.27
An example of the consequences of the inconsistent exception-riddled privacy information system is a recent Wyoming federal court8
case which awarded damages against the Veterans Administration.
The nurses at a federal hospital objected when the hospital disclosed
their personnel evaluation files to a fellow nurse who requested them
because of dismay over the ratings which had been given by hospital
management.2 9 The requester had a union position but those whose files
were disclosed were outraged when disclosure occurred with the con30
currence of the Washington headquarters of the agency. Ultimately,
after hiring counsel and pursuing the case for an extended period, the
nurses won nominal damages.3 1 Beyond the Privacy Act, constitutional
due process case law allows damages against government agents who
32
violate privacy, if an egregious offense has occurred. But absent a
severe case of abuse, it is quite difficult to assert one's desire for privacy against the government's efficiency-based decision to disseminate
a file. Our FOIA recognizes no power of the individual to compel the
33
government to withhold a personal file from disclosure by the agency.
V.

MEDICAL DATA EMERGING ISSUES

The private sector's use of personal information is expanding into
new areas of medical data as health care providers become even more
cost conscious and as the identification of better "risks" for the group
26. See supra note 25.
27. The Privacy Act, where it applies, permits injunctive relief only in two narrow circumstances: (I) to amend records and (2) to order agencies to produce records improperly withheld. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(A), (3)(A) (1982); see also Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1980).
Otherwise, money damages are the only available remedy under federal law. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(g)(4) (1982).
28. Andrews v. Veterans Admin., 613 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Wyo. 1985).
29. Id. at 1407.
30. Id. at 1408.
31. Id. at 1416 (plaintiffs awarded $1,000 apiece-the minimum they could receive under
the Privacy Act).
32. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 983-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (a violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments for federal agents to open plaintiff's mail without a warrant);
see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(allowing action for damages against United States government for violation of fourth
amendment).
33. The Privacy Act grants no power for a reverse-disclosure suit by the subject of the file.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). If such review authority exists, it must be found in the Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706(2)(A) (1982); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281 (1979).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
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health care system becomes an appropriate marketing strategy. Utilization of health services produces bits of data which cumulatively place
the individual into analyzable categories. Data builds the customer profile in health care as in other service sales contexts. Sharing of data
among collectors is the most efficient means of building the customer
profiles. In turn, the more efficient customer profile reduces the cost of
selling the service or product.
In the competitive health care market, use of profile data on past
health service use by individual applicants for a health maintenance
organization, for example, would be invaluable. Data helps to weed out
the high-cost members of a group whose service needs would exceed
predictable premium income. But relatively few cases exist in which
the individual as a potential customer has been able to assert the right
not to be included in someone else's computerized data base. 4 As the
controversies simmer, the competitive significance of the possession of
large sets of individual medical records and the undisclosed inclusion of
individuals into medical records data files are likely to be a future
source of more privacy litigation. Legislated schemes for balancing privacy protection needs against legitimate reasons for sharing files would
be easy to draft but difficult to pass through Congress. Until the demands for privacy protection become more forcefully articulated, the
prospects for improved systemic protection do not look promising.
Is the image of protectability real or imagined? Consider the hurdles faced by the individual patient who learns that his or her medical
file has been released to an undesired recipient. After the release of
personal medical data without the individual's consent to a third party
who sought access to that data, the individual might sue and possibly
might win some money from some privacy-invading persons--or federal agencies (if they are not exempted from the Privacy Act) 3 -under
some circumstances, if the individual's counsel is very astute and if the
court is sympathetic. Privacy invasion tort actions are for wealthy
plaintiffs; they are not cases to be taken on contingent fee. These cases
are not capable of resolution without extensive billable hours since few
private sector lawyers are familiar with the intricacies of privacy litigation. Our system, however, offers only the right to sue after the act, not
much in the way of affirmative pre-release protection.
Who has the power and incentive to use the remedies for privacy
protection? In nations with more structured systems, power is balanced
34. The right not to be on a computer list of another person may be protected in tort but
such a case would be relatively novel in the tort theory of most states. A. WESTIN, supra note 4.
35. Exemptions remove many files from the purview of the Privacy Act, and several agenPublished
by per
eCommons,
1986
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se exempted.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)-(k) (1982).
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by a statutory delineation of rights and responsibilities, modifying the
employer-employee or surveyor-subject legal relationship to accommo36
date the primacy of the individual's rights. The system for disclosure
in the United States dictates that those who have information about the
individual can use it subject to the rather remote prospect that they
could be sued for damages later. Litigation costs inhibit the exercise of
those rights. Ours is a highly decentralized approach to the gathering
and use of personal information.
VI.

CENTRALIZATION

Centralization of privacy authority is not a panacea for privacy
rights enforcement, but it makes a great deal of sense for the individual
seeking vindication of the right to be left alone. The one effort we made
to centralize, placing power in the Office of Management and Budget
to interpret the Privacy Act,"7 was a total failure, as Congress reported
in a recent study.38 There have been many considerations of such privacy structures as a permanent commission or an information administration. In 1977-78, the Privacy Protection Study Commission's extensive study and report called for a systemic improvement in our
preservation of individual privacy.3 9 With rare exceptions, the excellent
report has gathered dust ever since its rational and clear arguments for
a privacy protection structure were offered nearly a decade ago. The
Administrative Conference's 1986 Grunewald Report was the first ef0
fort in ten years to address structural change.' It addressed the need
for a mechanism by which the individual or business could contest the
and could oppose a
government's decision to override confidentiality
4
.
FOIA
the
under
disclosure of information
In multinational discussions of privacy and data flow, other nations
36. See, e.g., 11I Can. Stat 3321 (private organizations are likely to be affected by the
soon-to-be-enacted provincial privacy legislation). Sweden's programs are among the world's most
privacy sensitive. Lelyveld, supra note 18.
37. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909, reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 552a note, at 417 (1982) (Guidelines and Regulations for Maintenance of Privacy and
Protection of Records of Individuals). This authority over the Privacy Act was limited to interpretations and guidance, some of which has been clearly rejected by the courts. Zeller v. United
States, 467 F. Supp. 487, 497 (D.D.C. 1979); see also Metadure Corp. v. United States, 490 F.
Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
38. OMB's failure as a privacy protection source is chronicled in COMMITTEE ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY? OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 BY THE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND BY THE CONGRESS, H.R. REP. No. 98-455, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983).
39. PPSC, supra note 15, at 37.
40.. M. GRUNEWALD, A STUDY OF THE DESIRABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO RESOLVE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND OTHER PUBLIC ACCESS
DISPUTES (1986).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
41. id.
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with a higher priority for personal privacy deride the complexities and
ineffectiveness of the United States system. By comparison to other
technologically sophisticated democracies, the privacy protection systems of the United States fall far short. We have a patchwork rather
than a mosaic. Ours is not a privacy-driven system, and ours is not a
predictable system. Compared with Canada's effective and official dedication to the privacy ideal,4 our system of privacy protection is-to
return to the Queensberry rules of boxing analogy-an amateur
fistfight without consistent rules. Because of the relatively scant attention paid to privacy issues in recent congressional enactments, there are
no uniform, predictable "Queensberry" rules to move us beyond individual "fistfighting" and into the system of privacy protection. 4 3
VII. SIGNIFICANCE OF FEDERAL AUDITABILITY
In the medical research field, data on individual patients is almost
always auditable by government officials under one or another program, including the Professional Standards Review programs, Medicare, Medicaid, biomedical research, and other quality and quantity
measures administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. 4 Inspection of medical patient records enables the government to
account for its health care dollars and to supervise the work of data
collection for later submission to the government by potential marketers of drugs or medical products. Audits are familiar and records inspection is easily anticipated. Thus, an audit often takes patient records
for examination, but the patient does not often know why, when, and
for what purposes the records are being reviewed.
The potential for an audit, however, does not translate into direct
control or release of the records by federal agencies. Indeed, the Su6 that
preme Court decided in Forsham v. Harris"
the right of the government to have access to a contractor's medical records data base did
not mean that the contractor should be considered to have the same
duties of public disclosure as the federal agencies would have."6 This is
42. See supra note 36.
43. Congressional enactments in recent years have even eroded aspects of privacy, for instance, by permitting computer matching of tax and other files for the purpose of detecting a
debtor's sources of income. Note, Federal Government Computer Data Sharing and the Threat to
Privacy, 61 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 605 (1984).
44. These audit powers of different programs vary in their need for personal medical information. The FDA's supervision of clinical records of test subjects in drug and medical device
testing, for example, includes very careful examination of the records of patients who receive the
tested drug or medical device, 21 C.F.R. § 812.145 (1986), while the Health Care Financing
Administration audits patient medical records, id. § 482.24, and Health Maintenance Organization audits patient records. Id. § 417.236.
45. 445 U.S. 169 (1981).
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becoming more important as cancer and other chronic health risks are
being studied through the use of large scale epidemiology screening of
populations likely to have been exposed to potential carcinogens. Their
medical experiences may provide the needed clues to the discovery of
the causation of cancer or birth defects. Since the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) operates through entities which are partially state and
partially federal in nature, 7 disputes about access to state epidemiologthe federal access laws have been a complex, conical records through
8
troversial topic.'

VIII.

ANALYZING THE MEDICAL PRIVACY LAWS

The proceeding privacy analysis can be applied to four federal
laws which have some influence upon privacy of medical research subjects. The four primary statutory influences on data sharing are contained in the Privacy Act,'4 9 the FOIA, 50 the Federal, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 51 and the Public Health Service Act." The analysis we
undertake with regard to privacy under these laws must answer four
standard questions: Who? What? Why? And when?
We first ask who has the information, for no regulation of private
53
collections of data exists in the federal sphere. Only the federal
agency data collector is covered, if she is not so fortunate as to be exempted, and not all federal collections meet the criteria for Privacy Act
coverage. 4 Medical research records can be considered to be Privacy
Act records only in very rare situations in which they have been spe55
cially collected, defined, and treated by the collecting agency.
Records of patients may be confidential under certain state laws, but
their protection and scope vary considerably.5"

47. The state Epidemiology Intelligence Service officers within each state health department
are employees of the federal CDC.
48. Cf. Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1983) (epidemiological studies compiled by the Center for Disease Control and various state agencies were key
evidence in finding liability against tampon manufacturer).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
50. Id. § 552.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1982).
52. 24 U.S.C § 241 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
53. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C § 552(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986) ("Each
agency shall make available to the public information as follows .... ") (emphasis added).
54. Only a "system of records" which is designated by the agency as being retrieved by the
name of the individual is covered. Id. §§ 552(a)(5), 552a(b). Therefore, medical records organized
by hospital name, clinical investigator, product, investigation number, and other methods are not
affected.
55. For example, subjects of an epidemiology study were protected from disclosure under
the Privacy Act in a litigated case involving the CDC. Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724
F.2d 613, 618 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
56. State protection of medical patient files is discussed in Note, Privacy Rights in Medical
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Then we ask what the information is-the type of record-because
some records in the federal system are presumed to be private, but
most are not. 57 The type of record may be one which is presumed disclosable, like a grant application by a medical school researcher; or
legally protectable at the government's option, like a set of drug-efficacy case-report files for patients treated with a new drug; or presumed
confidential, like a record of Medicare patient treatments, which enjoys
clear statutory protections."8
Then we ask why it should be considered for confidentiality at all.
The strong presumption in favor of disclosure of all federal files found
in the FOIA is difficult to overcome.5 9 The law presumes a denial of
confidentiality. Overriding the presumption in favor of FOIA disclosure
involves such an exertion of time and bureaucratic energy that the
norm has become one of disclosure. Case-law developments favor disclosure.60 The affected individual either lobbies for an express exemption from the FOIA or lives with the expectation that his or her data
will be released.
Finally, we ask when we should look for confidentiality as the appropriate result. The particular law may have included a clear directive
not to disclose. 61 That is relatively unusual. Most often, Congress or the
state legislature which set up the reporting system requires a balancing
test to determine whether disclosure is permissible. The balancing test
under federal law turns upon an analysis of what is "clearly" protected. 62 Many disclosures of government files are legitimate; some are
unwarranted, but only those medical or personnel files whose release is

Records, 13

FORDHAM

URB. L.J. 165 (1985). The privilege and protective statutes are listed in R.

SMITH, supra note 7, at 10.

57. Records presumed to be private, or in other words, records which fall within the coverage of the Privacy Act, are records which contain information about individuals and are maintained by an agency which can retrieve the information by the name of the individual or some
other identifying symbol. 5 U.S.C § 552a(a)-(b) (1982).
58. The federal agency has classification power to list a file as a Privacy Act "system of
records," as well as power to use discretion toward disclosure once classification has occurred
through "routine use" regulations. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) (1982). Such agency classifications are
readily accepted by the courts. See, e.g., Ely v. Department of Justice, 610 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. 111.
1985).
59. The FOIA makes an express presumption of disclosure for all federal agency files subject to the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982), except for those records which fall within nine
relatively narrow exemptions. Id. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
60. See generally I J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 9.07 (1977 &
Supp. 1986).
61. Medicare patient files have such a clear direction. 42 U.S.C. § 242m(d) (1982).
62. The FOIA does not allow disclosure of "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6) (1982); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 note 134 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986) (collecting
numerous
balancing-test cases).
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by eCommons,
1986

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 12:2

63
clearly unwarranted are exempted from disclosure under the FOIA.
These basic questions can be applied to an analysis of the four
statutory sources of privacy protection, in order to assess the medical
subject's rights. Apart from these statutory protections, the option of
individual damages litigation against an improper use may exist at
state law. 64 But the chances for the individual to win sufficient damages
after a high initial outlay of costs are remote, so statutory protection is
most important.

A.

The Privacy Act

First, the Privacy Act defines the right of federal agencies to set
up filing systems on individuals. 6 5 If a federal agency is covered at all,
66
and not totally exempted like the CIA and FBI, it should comply
with the file creation requirements of the Act. The Act is very long and
rather tedious; it details the procedural red tape involved in the maintenance of such files, and it allows the individual to ask for copies of his
67
personal records if he jumps through the proper procedural hoops.
The appearance of protection of individual rights is greater than the
reality. The Privacy Act is not really followed by the agencies as they
would, for example, follow the terms of a substantive or enabling
statute.
The Privacy Act contains a few provisions which are easily and
widely observed, such as the one-time publication of a list of systems
68
and restrictions on social security number use. But as a charter of
personal rights, the Act has been a failure. Violation of the Privacy
Act's spirit is virtually an everyday occurrence, since the protections
that it was meant to provide, such as notification and logging of disclosures, simply have not worked according to the model of the legislation.
Violation of the Privacy Act's letter may also be an everyday occurrence, because with so very few enforcement actions and so few reported cases, 69 no one can tell whether its strict wording has been

63. See supra note 62.
64. State law controls the damage prospects and recoveries for invasions of personal privacy.
See generally Note, supra note 56; Annotation, supra note 19.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)-(f) (1982).

66. Id. § 552U).
67. Id. § 552a(d).
68. A "rider" on the Privacy Act precludes the use of social security numbers. The Privacy
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 417
(1982) (Disclosure of Social Security Number).
69. There have only been about 100 cases reported under the Privacy Act, most of them
trial court decisions on summary judgment, as compared with more than 1,000 reported FOIA
decisions, many of them in the appellate courts. OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST (Sept. 1985 ed.) [hereinafter CASE
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
LIST].
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matched by strict practice.
Informed observation would suggest that the Privacy Act delivers
little of its promised benefits for consumers, medical patients, and
others. It offers great promise as a developmental base for refined analysis of individual rights and systemic protections, such as data-base collection protections and better opportunities for the individual to learn
in advance of the proposed dissemination of individualized data. As an
unfinished base, the Act has become another layer of procedural red
tape encumbering administrative agencies' daily work, rather than a
total-commitment quality requirement.
B.

Freedom of Information Act

The FOIA, in comparison with the Privacy Act, is well known and
well understood." It covers huge quantities of documents, not merely
those found in certain arrangements of nonexempted file systems which
are subject to the narrower Privacy Act. The FOIA is familiar to many
newspaper organizations that often use it to disclose to the public controversial information in the hands of the government.7 1 Its relatively
simple message is that one can ask any federal agency for any document. The public makes written requests, more than 100,000 each year,
and the agencies either disclose the documents or claim exemptions.
The FOIA has not been as successful as it might have been. It has
clearly been more litigated than anyone expected when the bill was first
adopted in 1966.72 No one is satisfied with the inefficiencies and abuses
of the system, including the FOIA's most frequent individual users,
federal prisoners. The promise of easy access and rapid decision making in the public interest has generally gone undelivered. It is more
predictable than other legislation, but used less often for public goals
than for private snooping.73 Equitable considerations do not limit the
ability of the requester, for the agencies and the courts are barred from
creating new exceptions to disclosure beyond those provided by the
statute itself. None of the users are satisfied with the Act's procedural
problems, and its exemptions are difficult to construe.
There is an exemption to the FOIA for personal privacy documents, 7' but there is no personal right to enforce the exemption.75

70. The FOIA has generated great news media coverage, several books, and more than a
hundred published articles. See id. at 367-93.
71. The FOIA has been used for obtaining information about spies, drug dealers, assorted
criminals, unidentified flying objects, and a host of other controversial issues.
72. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
73. More than 85% of the FOIA requests received by the Food and Drug Administration,
for example, come from agents of business firms seeking useful information about their competitors or abuut FDA surveillance of their products.
5 U.S.C § 552(b)(4)
Published74.by eCommons,
1986 (1982).

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 12:2

Every government employee can disclose a requested document to "any
person" who seeks its disclosure-but relatively few employees have the
authority to officially deny disclosure.7 6 At the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), more than 40,000 requests come in each year, most
from companies seeking each others' testing or other commercially useful data. At FDA, hundreds of individuals can respond with disclosures
and only one, the Associate Commissioner for Public Affairs, can respond with denials. 7 7 Medical data is most frequently requested from
the FDA, and to a lesser extent from the CDC and other agencies of
the Department of Health and Human Services.
Because there is no personal right to enforce the personal privacy
exemption, an individual who finds that a federal agency has disclosed
his personal record under an FOIA request cannot act before or after
the disclosure.7 8 The individual cannot bring what has been known as
"reverse FOIA suits," enjoining disclosure by the agency, to protect a
noncommercial interest like personal medical privacy. Relatively few
cases have been tried.7 The better agencies provide for notification
before disclosure of the personal information and make a decision only
after hearing both sides of the disclosure question, but there is no statutory right to such process.8 0 The person whose medical records are released under the FOIA by a federal agency cannot successfully argue
that the Federal Torts Claims Act allows recovery, since disclosure is
considered to be an intentional tort for which civil damages are not
recoverable against the government.8 1

75. Though an individual could argue for such a right of self-protection, it is unlikely to be
successful. Commercial protections have been possible because of the existence of the Trade
Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), but personal privacy does not receive the same attention.
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 244 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also
Florida Medical Ass'n v. HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291 (M.D. Fla. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 601
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. A final withholding decision must by made by the agency head or his delegate. 5 U.S.C.
9 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1982).
77. 21 C.F.R. § 20.47 (1986).
78. There is no injunctive remedy available under the FOIA itself, Chrysler Corp v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979), and the disclosure would be intentional, so the negligence-based
waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Torts Claims Act would not apply. 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h) (1982).
79. E.g., Washington Research Project, 504 F.2d at 238, 244 n.6; St. Paul's Benevolent
Educ. & Missionary Inst. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 822, 287 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
80. The FDA might allow personal notice in an individual case, but has no obligation to do
so as a matter of law. 2 J. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 22.07 (1979 & Supp.
1986). FDA's parent department has an overall rate of releasing 98.9% of all documents requested, which in a calendar year was 101,602 out of 102,279 requests. Burnham, Assessing Freedom of Information Act, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1985, at BlO, col. 4.
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680 (1980). There would be no recovery in the federal action,
and responding to a lawful access request has no counterpart in private nongovernmental activihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
ties. Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 182 (D. Minn.), affid, 610 F.2d 558

1986]
C.

MEDICAL PRIVACY

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 2 is a little more explicit about personal and medical information, requiring that drug and
medical device patient information be treated with "due regard" for
patient rights. 83 Medical device data is subject to a special section of
the Act which provides that patient identities may not be required to be
disclosed when the FDA audits the activities of a private sector clinic,
but the section's exceptions cover broad objectives, such as determining
that the device is effective or verifying a test record, which could nullify the anticipated protections."" The individual patient whose experience with a drug or device is used in an FDA application is offered
protection under FDA regulations,"5 however, and these specifically
control the disclosure practices which affect personal data about these
patients.
D.

Public Health Service Act

The Public Health Service Act, governing the roles of the CDC
and National Institutes of Health in government-funded disease monitoring and prevention, allows for the disclosure of a wide variety of
research data "through publications and other appropriate means."' 6 In
most cases, the Public Health Service's authority to withhold information comes from the creation of a Privacy Act system of records; in a
few cases, such as with Medicare and Medicaid files, special provisions
prohibit disclosures.' 7 It forms the legal basis for the epidemiological
research done by the CDC and National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), which are segments of the Public Health
Service." Disclosure of detailed medical records by these two organizations has been very controversial, since the reports of adverse medical
effects by either organization carries important regulatory and public
relations consequences for the factories, products, or areas which CDC
or NIOSH researchers examine. In General Motors Corp. v. Director
of the National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health," the
(8th Cir. 1979); see Note, Rejecting Absolute Immunity for Federal Officials, 71
1707 (1983).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1982).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 360i(a)(4), (b).
85. 21 C.F.R. § 20.111 (1986).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).

CALIF.

L.

REV.

87. Id. § 242m(d).
88.

Both agencies are currently part of the Public Health Service within the Department of

Health and Human Services.

OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 280 (1986-87).
636 F.2d 163 1986
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981).
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right of the individual to deny access to his own file was overridden,
after the individual preferences had been polled and the files had been

acquired by NIOSH. 0 In Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing
Co.,9' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the use in evidence

of a CDC telephone survey which drew conclusions from information
concerning former medical patients' symptoms and product causation,
with no disclosure of the patient identities and no opportunity for rebuttal of the findings by the CDC's opponents.92

IX.

THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT AND AGENCY
ATTITUDES

The sharing of medical data, once collected, can be the basis for
multiple examinations of the same disease-causation theory. With sharing, the data can be verified or replicated. The benefits and burdens of
data sharing have been capably covered by a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study issued in 1985." The NAS Committee performed a
useful service in suggesting government policy alterations which might
provide social scientists and medical professionals with wider access to
personal data.9 4 But governmental policy, particularly disclosure policy,
often clashes with the scientific ideal of academic data sharing which is
reflected in the NAS study. Sharing has been inhibited by the FOIA.
Prior to that statute's adoption in 1966, governmental policy on data
disclosure presumed that data would be withheld until the agency
wished to publish it.9" This well-documented philosophy of tactical nondisclosure might be called the Paul Masson syndrome-"we will disclose nothing before its time." But the selective timing and content of
governmental disclosure is no longer legitimate. Federal agencies have
been forced by court decisions enforcing the FOIA to release more documents more rapidly in response to more frequent requests. The significance of this historic change in attitudes is that the submitter's reliance
in continued confidentiality, which once was exhibited by informal
promises of confidentiality by government officials to the private data
submitters, has been lost. One not only cannot rely on an informal assurance-one does not get them at all.
Agency managers in the federal system, faced with litigation costs

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 165.
724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 618-19.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SHARING RESEARCH

SHARING RESEARCH DATA (1985)

DATA, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS,

[hereinafter SHARING RESEARCH DATA].

94. The report approached the issue from statistical, academic-and legal perspectives. See
generally id. at 3-36.
95. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1965).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
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from unsuccessful defenses of FOIA suits, have structured the decisional process about data sharing to take it out of the hands of
nonlawyers. A decision to share data with a university epidemiologist is
more the responsibility of counsel than of the scientific staff of the
agency. Confidentiality promises of the FDA, for example, require a
quasi-formal adjudication with detailed legal maneuvering.96 Furthermore, confidentiality adjudication rights have been contested, sometimes successfully, by persons unhappy with the treatment which FDA
gave to their private information.
Secrecy in decision making had been one of the symbols of power
possessed by executive agencies. The suddenness of the changing philosophy in the mid-1970's toward less secrecy, combined with the
Carter Administration's strong pro-disclosure stance, instituted an
FOIA philosophy of "when in doubt, send it out." Case law required an
agency which shared a document with one requesting person to disclose
it to all subsequent requesters. 97 The pressure to make drafts of new
rules available to all sides led to a corresponding limitation on the number of drafts which an agency staff would create and the number of
copies which they would circulate.98 But preservation of internal
agency documents as secret did not cause a corresponding sensitivity to
the release of nonagency documents.
X.

DISCLOSURE CASES IN THE COURTS

A sample of five FOIA cases involving requests for disclosure of
arguably personal information illustrates the developments.
In the first case, Robles v. EPA,9 9 the EPA performed a study of
the effect of radon gas on homes which had been built with some potentially radioactive materials taken from a uranium mill site. Though
confidentiality had been informally promised,"'0 disclosure was ordered
by the trial court and affirmed on appeal, with the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals holding that the equities of the situation, reliance on
promises of confidentiality, were overridden by the pro-disclosure approach of the FOIA.10 ' Promises of confidentiality for health-related
surveys are not enough to overcome the Act's pro-disclosure direction.
The Robles court noted that limited disclosures had occurred in
96. 21 C.F.R. § 20.111 (1986); see Carson Prod. Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1979); Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Kennedy, 460 F. Supp. 268 (D.D.C. 1978).
97. North Dakota v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1978).
98. The elimination of ready access to drafts of agency regulations was offset by the
lengthier process of review after rules are proposed. See generally J. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING ch. 9 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
99. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 844.
101. Id. at 848.
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the past without objection. 10 2 But now, all the survey results would be
released to anyone. Disclosure to all requesters alike may be unfair in
terms of consequences to individuals, but it is the FOIA's mandate.
The homeowners would be informed whether they were exposed to radon levels above limits, but the same data would be released to anyone,
extinguishing any potential for ever selling the homes. The court ordered disclosure of the details even though there had been a confidentiality expectation on the part of the survey participants and even though
the individual homeowners would suffer a total loss of marketability of
their homes as a result of disclosure.
In St. Paul's Benevolent Educational & Missionary Institute v.
United States,10 8 a church group which was engaged in a public controversy over the effects of infant formula upon child mortality and disease patterns did a survey and accumulated raw data on this subject.10 4
The group had a clear advocacy goal for use of that data in a struggle
with more economically powerful opponents. The group could leverage
its power with governmental assistance, and the government appeared
to be sympathetic. The group shared the detailed raw data with the
CDC in order to obtain a CDC computer analysis. 10 5 Then the competing formula manufacturing firms requested that CDC disclose the data
which was in CDC's possession to perform their own analysis, before
'the church group's press release announcing its statistical findings.10 ,
The CDC made an initial decision and a Washington official, sent as a
hearing officer for the appeal, ruled in favor of disclosure to the indus10 7
try requester.
The church group sued to block disclosure of the raw data. The
court dismissed the suit and held that there was no legal right inuring
to a nonprofit owner of private data to protect it from a discretionary
disclosure by the government.10 8
The National Academy of Sciences' lengthy study, Sharing Research Data, covers the St. Paul's case in a light most favorable to the
researching group.1 0 9 It might have been more just and equitable, perhaps, for the government to have honored the group's expectation of
confidentiality. Without confidentiality, for example, the group could
not publish its statistics in a peer-reviewed journal and achieve priority

102. Id. at 846.
103. 506 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
104. Id. at 823-24.
105. Id. at 826.
106. Id. at 826-27.
107. Id. at 827.
108. Id. at 828.
109. SHARING RESEARCH DATA, supra note 93, at 159 (from a commissioned paper written
by J. Cecil and E. Griffin).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/2
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of Publication. But in light of FOIA case law, equitable considerations
were irrelevant, and the researchers were foolish to expect that the
CDC could keep that information confidential. They made a faulty assumption that the government applies one standard of confidentiality to
all of its data.
In practice under the FOIA, one must assume that a double standard will be applied when an agency is faced with a request for disclosure of documents which the creator did not yet desire to disseminate at
large, because the information is of a draft or evolving policy nature or
because premature release would damage some recognizable interest
such as the academician's interest in priority of technical publication or
patentability of a new invention.11 0 The government routinely withholds
its own materials as predecisional and therefore premature for disclosure. However, materials of equivalent status, given to the same government agency by private persons, are readily released."'
Government applies a double standard to meet its own priorities,
and perhaps, the submitting group in St. Paul's had received poor legal
advice when it shared data with the government as directly as it did.
But such dissemination of private data by the government is a natural
consequence of having placed "government in a goldfish bowl."
The third case, National Association of Atomic Veterans, Inc. v.
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency," 2 involved individuals who had
been exposed to atmospheric nuclear weapons tests before their discharge from the military. A nonprofit group believed that adverse
health effects form exposure remain latent for years before becoming
manifest. As a result, the group wanted to solicit former military personnel for joint epidemiological studies and eventual litigation against
the government. Names of the individuals were held by the military,
ostensibly collected with a promise of confidentiality.' 3 The military
argued that the group's effort was redundant of existing federal health
programs for the same class of persons, so disclosure would not serve a
public purpose.
The court held that the fact an individual may have been affected
adversely by exposure to radiation, with medical consequences, could
be taken into account. But the court ordered disclosure of the lists because inquiries about medical conditions, made after the release of
names and addresses, would not in themselves implicate any privacy

110. Id. at 178-80.
111. A pre-decisional private document is'not exempted unless it fits into one of the special
exemption categories. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 244 (D.C. Cir.
1974); St. Paul's, 506 F. Supp. at 829.
112. 583 F. Supp. 1483 (D.D.C. 1984).
Confidentiality1986
had been promised. Id. at 1488 n.6.
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concerns, and the public interest in disclosure outweighed medical privacy concerns of the veterans." 4 The court also noted that promises of
confidentiality had been made under the Privacy Act and, as noted earlier in this paper, the FOIA disclosure power overrides the Privacy Act
withholding authority, so disclosure could be ordered under the
FOIA.1 1 1 Despite the confidentiality, pledge, therefore, names and addresses were disclosed so that the requester group could contact the
30,000 affected persons.
In the fourth case, Kurzon v. Department of Health & Human
Services,"' the appellant, Dr. Kurzon, disputed the government's selective funding of research grants and demanded access to the identities of
rejected grant applicants. Dr. Kurzon wanted this information to test
his own hypothesis that unorthodox research proposals were generally
refused.1 17 The district court denied Dr. Kurzon's request, reasoning
that the public interest to be served by disclosure was outweighed by
the privacy interests of rejected applicants. 1 8 The court of appeals, believing that rejected grant applicants have very little privacy interest in
the disclosure of their identities, reversed the district court's ruling and
held that the government had to grant Dr. Kurzon access to the rejected grant applicants' identities. 1 9 The court believed that the
records protected by exemption 6 of the FOIA had to contain personal
information consisting of "'intimate details' of a 'highly personal' nature." 2 The court concluded that the information at issue in this case
was simply not intimate enough for exemption 6 protection.
In the fifth case, United State Department of State v. Washington
Post, 2 ' the United States Supreme Court decided that citizenship
could be "personal" information. The Washington Post wanted information on whether two Iranians who were believed to be in the Iranian
capital held United State's citizenship. The FOIA exemption covered
personnel, medical, and similar files. The Supreme Court said that virtually any information about an individual which was personal to that
individual was enough to meet the "similar" standard but that not all
information claimed to be confidential would be protected. 22 This decision broadened the categories which might qualify for protection as
similar files but did not change the pro-disclosure presumption of the
114. Id. at 1487-88.
115. Id. at 1488.
116. 649 F.2d 65 (Ist Cir. 1981).
117. Id. at 66.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 68-70.
120. Id. at 68. See supra note 62.
121. 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
122. Id. at 604.
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"clearly unwarranted" standard, under which agencies bear a strong
burden to hold personnel files as confidential documents.12 3

XI.

THE FORSHAM DECISION

These five cases illustrate the difficulty of preserving confidentiality for the records of medical research subjects. The landmark Supreme Court case involving medical records of diabetes patients, Forsham v. Harris,2 4 added a new wrinkle to the law of records disclosure by subcategorizing the possessors of medical records into strict
agency/nonagency categories. 2 5 A lengthy study of diabetes in
thousands of patients was conducted under government supervision,
and at the government's expense, by a contractor whose work was a
direct substitution for a governmental research study by a body such as
the National Institutes of Health. 2 6 Opponents of the study's medical
conclusions recognized that the federal sponsor controlled the study,
and their FOIA request assumed that the agency controlled the study's
records. However, if the records were not released, then the validity of
the government's conclusions could not be impeached, since the raw
statistical data could not be accessed by researchers who wanted to examine the study's conclusions.
The Supreme Court in Forsham held that the government agency
responsible for creating and funding the study had lacked physical possession of the diabetes study reports and thus could not be compelled to
disclose them even though the study was funded and supervised actively by federal agency personnel.127 The technical differentiation between "agency record" status and non-record status was imperceptible
from outside the agency, but the Supreme Court held it to be legally
controlling over the disclosability of the medical information.
XII.

LESSONS FROM THE FOIA CASES

Forsham was more of a procedural than a policy decision, not
helpful to the overall issue of privacy protections for individuals' medical information. For that guidance, it is necessary to distill the dozens
of cases dealing with the FOIA and personal privacy.
The first lesson of the FOIA cases dealing with individual privacy
is that there can be no legal reliance interest in the exclusive possession
of medical or technical data after it is shared with government. 1 28

123. Id. at 600-01.
124. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
125. Id. at 184-87.
126. Id. at 171-74.
127. Id. at 186.
Compare National
Published128.
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There will be no blanket assurance of confidentiality. Only totally excluding data from government possession can assure the owner of full
recoupment of rights or value in data. Remedies such as damages
against the government are quite unlikely. The Supreme Court in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 12 9 left open the possibility of Tucker
Act' 30 relief when commercial technical data is disclosed, 1 3 ' but that
relief is not likely to be available for personal or medical data. The
government has a great deal of discretion in disclosure determinations,
and most of the consequences of that discretion are not subject to compensation.13 2 Only what government does not have in hand, government
cannot release.
In the absence of a realistic expectation of confidentiality, the
guiding principle should be to watch what people do, not what they say,
about trusting government. The creation of special data registries such
as the diabetes registry in Forsham could be a method of keeping information out of government files and thereby maintain its secrecy. The
rise of the confidentiality depositories for aggregate production data
during EPA rule making is a reflection of mistrust in the government's
confidential handling of valuable commercial data.'
The sharing of
data is often conditioned with safeguards; Congress has been prodded
on occasion to adopt stringent nondisclosure requirements for certain
agency files containing private sector documents.' 3
Second, once documents are in federal-agency custody, they are
subject to the agency's discretion and one cannot expect that a private
person will successfully block an agency decision to disclose. The submitter, as patient or as researcher, simply cannot trust government to

Agency, 583 F. Supp. 1483 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the Defense Nuclear Agency, a government department, had to disclose names of atomic veterans in its possession) with Forsham v.
Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980) (holding that HEW did not have to disclose test data in the possession of an outside contractor).
129. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984) (appellee pesticide manufacturer allowed to sue EPA in the
United States Claims Court under the Tucker Act to recover for the unconstitutional taking that
may result from the use by other pesticide manufacturers of commercially valuable data appellee
had to submit to that agency).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982) (allowing claims against the United States based on the
constitution and other laws to be brought in the United States Claims Court).
131. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2880-82. Commercial data on pesticide testing was provided
to the EPA by an applicant seeking approval of a pesticide. Id. at 2871. An argument for extending the Tucker Act to drug information has recently been proposed for clinical data on human
test subjects having commercial value. Beers & Zovickian, Generic Drug Law May Spawn 'Taking' Claims, Legal Times, Apr. 14, 1986, at 16, col. 1.
132. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2875 (holding that a taking cannot occur when one submits
data to a government agency with the knowledge that the information will be disclosed).
133. Cf. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975)
(listing alternative means of collecting data).
134. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(2) (Supp. !11 1985).
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withhold documents. Government discretion is ultimately colored by
the agency's interests as seen by its lawyers as of the day before trial.
Clients must be advised that discretionary decisions are unlikely to be
overturned in the courts and that the costs of litigation against a federal agency which seeks a precedential affirmance of its discretion will
be prohibitively expensive.
Third, the FOIA cases on privacy are often won by the government. Disclosure to an FOIA requester is not likely to be an actionable
source of financial recovery if the agency has followed its normal FOIA
procedures. 135 The prospect of a successful action for damages under
the Tucker Act is most unlikely absent agency misconduct." 6 In a late
1984 decision, a California fruit-packing firm was awarded millions of
dollars in damages resulting from the FDA's issuance of incorrect and
unfair publicity about the firm's fruit, which had been packed with
cyclamates before that sweetener was banned by the FDA.' 37 The firm
had to seek congressional passage of a private bill and then endure the
litigation costs of a protracted trial in the Claims Court. The decision
was later reversed 38 and so the firm still has not collected, fifteen years
after the adverse publicity ruined its market in cyclamate-sweetened
canned fruits and drove the firm into bankruptcy. The prospect of the
medical patient recovering for embarrassment, humiliation, or opprobrium arising out of an FOIA disclosure is illusory. At best, one could
argue for constitutional damage recovery, but the odds against recovery
are great.'3 "
Fourth, disclosure to one requester ends in disclosure to all. There
is no selectivity in our system with respect to releases to special classes,
except in the rare case of consultants or advisory committee members.140 The reason why the government is uncooperative toward a

135. The Federal Torts Claims Act would not apply because the action was not negligent
but was the intentional dissemination of a requested document. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
136. Orme, Tucker Act Jurisdiction over Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV.
855, 881-82 (Tucker Act relief is subject to many uncertainties).
137. California Canners & Growers Ass'n v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 69 (1984), rev'd, 9 Cl.
Ct. 774 (1986).
138. Id.
139. A federal agency's disclosure is likely to be intentional as to the fact of disclosure and
neutral as to intent, so a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress probably
would not be available even if the Federal Torts Claims Act were to permit such intentional torts.
See supra note 135. Disclosure as a result of an FOIA request is presumed lawful. See 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B) (1982) (burden on agency to show records should be withheld), and would certainly
not be the egregious governmental conduct compensable as a "constitutional tort" under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or a deprivation
of a constitutional right to privacy without due process actionable under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1982).
140. Consultants and advisory committee members are not "any person" for purposes of the
FOIA's general disclosure provisions which treats all requesters alike. Cf. Lead Indus. Ass'n v.
Occupational
Safety & Health
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"worthy" researcher may be that agency managers recognize the precedent of release is controlling when others make the identical request. 141 Despite the bona fides of one requester, the peril of precedentmaking is an important consideration.
Fifth, the terms under which the exemption for personal privacy
applies remain fuzzy. The definitions of "clearly unwarranted" and
"similar files" are uncertain despite dozens of court cases attempting to
clarify the exemption.14 2 It is an exemption inherently subjective in
scope and unlikely to be amended soon.
Sixth, in this as in other cases, the reality of the bureaucracy overrules the abstraction of the law. The confidentiality of personal data is
in the hands of an overworked but dedicated group of disclosure officers. Life in an agency Freedom of Information office presents constant threats of adverse criticism, congressional dismay, and lawsuits if
the agency staff chooses to withhold. Mistakes are made and some mistaken releases have privacy consequences. The prospect of private information slipping through the net by error, for instance in the release
of a product-application file, is a real one. Some agencies have acted
accordingly to reduce their searching and disclosure efforts. Law enforcement agencies won total exemptions from the Privacy Act and
have sought comprehensive exemptions from the FOIA out of their
concern that convicts could readily use disclosed materials to retrace
48
the actual identities of informants.
Finally, a set of files which meets all Privacy Act requirements
and is properly marked and prepared for Privacy Act purposes is more
likely than others to be withheld, but no submitter can expect the documents in their entirety to be be subject to Privacy Act protections. Coverage by the Privacy Act is not automatic and not easy to establish for
the agency. While an original file marked "John Doe, X Hospital patient" rests quietly, protected under the Privacy Act, a duplicate copy
of a medical record may be released from a non-Privacy Act file

for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 466 F. Supp. 1088 (D.D.C.
1978).
141. Disclosure to one private party waives the exempt status of the document upon subsequent request by another party, since the record is no longer "confidential" absent some special
disclosure agreement on the first dissemination. North Dakota v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177 (8th Cir.
1978); see also County of Madison v. Department of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir. 1981).
142. The personal privacy exemption to the FOIA has been litigated in about 320 cases,
based upon 1985 statistics for 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) litigation. CASE LIST, supra note 69; see also
5 U.S.C.A. § 552 note, at 134 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
143. Proposals for reform of the FO1A would limit the use of the FOIA by convicted offenders, severely restricting their frequent use of the Act for inspection of law enforcement files.
The Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings on S. 774 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1985); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)
(1982) (categorically exempting law enforcement agencies from the Privacy Act).
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marked "X Hospital Audit." '4 4 Then, even if the Privacy Act applies,
the routine-use policy of that agency may favor disclosure to a particular type of requester. 1" Routine uses are dislosures made without notice to the file subject.146
XIII.

IMPACTS ON MEDICAL RESEARCH RECORDS

The FOIA and the Privacy Act do impinge on an agency's ability
to disclose personal information, but they do not deliver converse reassurance to the medical patient that his or her rights will be sufficiently
protected. The good news is that data can be protected when conditions
permit and a Privacy Act system applies or has not been avoided
through a routine-use regulation. The bad news is that the subject of
the medical research may not be sure whether his or her information is
secret in the hands of an impersonal bureaucratic health care machine.
Selective disclosure authority may be highly desirable. Epidemiology, the study of disease patterns and causes, would benefit from even
greater sharing of limited segments of data taken by a neutral, privacysensitive screener from a review of patient records. Government has a
large investment in the progress of epidemiology and feels strong incentives to increase its effectiveness as a disease-fighting weapon of medical research.1 47 The disclosure of personal medical information to other
epidemiologists who are studying the same rare disease condition could
have a net societal benefit, because their cumulative efforts to understand disease causation could hasten the achievement of a cure for the
disease. The Privacy Act may act as a deterrent to participation for
some studies. Certainly the FOIA's pro-disclosure propensities have
caused some hesitancy among some of the potential sources of medical
data. Fixing the problem with a reasonable statutory amendment for
epidemiological research may be the optimal solution.
XIV.

IMPACTS ON DISEASE AND INJURY DATA GATHERING

The impact of the privacy and information system on communications about personal illness, such as adverse drug reactions, merits fur144. A file is not covered by the Privacy Act unless the file is "assigned to the individual"
and retrieved from a "system of records" by the personal identifier of the individual, such as a
name or social security number. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (1982).
145. Id. § 552a(a)(7), (b)(3).
146. Id. § 552a(b)(3). Courts have been supportive of a broad exclusion of such records
from notification to the individual, permitting agencies to use the broad "routine-use" exemption
to avoid notification. Ely v. Department of Justice, 610 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Ili. 1985).
147. For example, the CDC, the EPA, and the FDA support epidemiological data-gathering, and with more attention to chronic illnesses, the government has considered "more frequent
and wider studies" of exposures and risks to toxic materials. Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY
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ther research by social scientists in the fields of organizational behavior, sociology, and epidemiology. While the system of processing
individual data into epidemiology data bases appears to proceed routinely, the conditions underlying this communication may not be optimal for the individual who has been the subject of the shared records.
The adverse drug-reaction reports flowing into the FDA from physicians and hospitals, and from the FDA's own surveillance, are computer-recorded and microfilmed; the original copies are promptly destroyed. The FDA makes it nearly impossible for the identities of the
patients to be released, first by computer safeguards within the Office
of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, and second by a tough FOIA regulation insisting that identity information will not be disclosed. 8
Medical records included in these voluntary reports are not the
sole source of privacy concerns. The FDA also pays attention to the
adverse drug-reaction reports which are filed by the manufacturers of
drugs, as required under the 1985 regulations on new drugs and the
comparable reports for medical devices. 49 These reports list associations with, not causes of, illnesses, since many of the reports do not
reflect a cause-and-effect relationship between the product and the
injury.
Cumulatively, the 60,000-plus drug-reaction reports and 20,000plus device reports allow the FDA to perform rapid examinations of the
potential risks of new and existing items and to plot the trends for further study by epidemiologists.' 50 A skilled researcher using adverse-reaction data, prescription-volume data from marketing services, and disease-demographic information from the CDC, can propose significant
correlations between diseases, responsive drugs' relative effectiveness,
and the likelihood of adverse consequences from drug usage.
XV.

TORT LAW AND EPIDEMIOLOGY

It is in the pre-discovery and even pre-litigation stages of productsliability litigation that the FOIA is most useful to civil-litigation coun148. FDA collection of information about adverse patient drug reactions is explained in 21
C.F.R. § 314.80 (1986) (subsection (h) of section 314.80 prohibits the inclusion of patient identifications in adverse drug reaction reports); see also DIVIsION OF DRUG & BIOLOGICAL PRODS.
EXPERIENCE, CENTER FOR DRUGS & BIOLOGICS, POSTMARKETING REPORTING OF ADVERSE DRUG

REACTIONS (1985)

[hereinafter GUIDELINE].
149. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1986) (on adverse drug-reaction reports); id. § 804.24 (adverse
devise-reaction reports).
150. The ability of the FDA to monitor the incoming reports is critical to its approval of
new drug and medical-device products. Limited test populations of between 200 and 1,000 patients may participate in the research use of new drugs and medical devices, but millions are
exposed after marketing. The FDA regulations are intended to screen out expected and normal
reactions from unexpected ones; FDA can then remove an unexpectedly dangerous drug from the
market. See GUIDELINE, supra note 148.
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sel, and it is in this phase that the loss of an expectation of confidentiality becomes significant. The sharing of privately compiled data with the
government exposes the data to FOIA disclosure requirements and the
problems that inhere in this process. Typically, the goal of an academic
researcher is to find a statistically valid correlation between disease occurrence and personal exposures to potentially causative factors. The
reward for the academic epidemiologist is priority of publication, being
first to discern and report a probable relationship. The publication process itself adds to the pressure for secrecy about the data findings.
Epidemiologists might continue their cooperative data sharing with
the government, notwithstanding government disclosure trends, simply
to obtain more grant funding or to cooperate with government-paid researchers in the same collaborative projects, if they care to do so. But
the flow of adverse reaction data is limited by the realization that government disclosure may be required, with adverse consequences for our
information system. The frustration for epidemiologists is that an imbalance exists-too much data can be obtained by those plaintiffs in
liability cases with no incentive to pursue societal health goals, while
too little is available to medical research academicians because of the
concern that openness allows too much damage to the product or the
agency program which is affected by the data. The irony is that adverse-experience reports can often be accessed in products-liability suits
when the challengers demand full raw-data files from the company
which has possession of those files.' 51 The challenger has the legal
power which the neutral or non-governmental researcher lacks to access the manufacturer's complete factual record on a suspected problem drug.
The government's ambivalence toward disclosure of the patient adverse-reaction reports may be a source of frustration to academic researchers. Release to one person is release to all, ending the expectation
of being first to reveal a statistical finding. Private data bases are on a
different basis than federal data bases; they need not disclose and they
may face some privacy disputes with hospitals or state officials, perhaps, if they disclose too much data too freely. An as-yet-undetermined
influence is federal prosecution of regulated firms for being too slow
publicly to report problems experienced with products. Faster disclosure of adverse reactions by the makers of the products, upon transmission of the report to a manufacturer from an academic researcher, may
be an inevitable cost for the academician as an indirect result of gov-

151.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Un48 FORDHAM L. REv. 735 (1980).
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ernment's time pressures upon the manufacturers. 5 2
The tort system is not merely a casual presence on the scene; its
influence on the process of collecting disease-causation data is so great
that it cannot go unnoticed. Plaintiffs may need medical epidemiology
data in order to lay the foundation for expert testimony on complex
issues of causation. For example, conclusions of an expert concerning
causation may involve heated debates over the validity and study design of an epidemiologic study.
It is natural, then, that tort law and scientific rationales for data
sharing will collide over the question of access to medical records in
drug therapy for disease conditions. The epidemiologist may feel frustrated that in an open and information-oriented society so many governmental, institutional, and litigation incentives have combined to
make useful data even less accessible for use than it has been in the
past. The science of epidemiology may be retarded in its growth by this
combination of constraints against the sharing of data, as well as the
constraints put upon future validation or reexamination of the analyses
of raw data by later scientists.15 3
Yet another frustration for the medical researcher seeking medical
patient files may be with government agencies which have had such
great control over information. If agency managers ever decided to maneuver figures to serve a short-term political or bureaucratic goal, their
choice not to share the raw data would be legally difficult to challenge.
Under case law, the walls of secrecy protecting motives and intentions
of federal officials would probably preclude an effective challenge by
any private party.1 54 The impeachment of an improper motive of a federal official is already quite difficult; where epidemiology is involved,
the burden may become insurmountable.

XVI.

REMEDIES

Citizens concerned with the privacy of their medical records and
epidemiologists seeking portions of those records for use in medical research are not likely to get any relief from Congress for the frustrations
discussed in this paper. The specific statutes which need to be amended

152. Loss of the novelty of a finding that a product is associated with a physiological effect
may be a loss to the priority of publication of the scientist. Such priority of publication is an
important rationale used in denying other researchers access to one's compilation of data. See
SHARING RESEARCH DATA, supra note 93, at 136. With the advent of deadlines for filing of data
with the FDA and with public access to that data, either the FDA's press office or a competitor
which observes adverse reaction rates may announce the possible correlation well before the academician can obtain scientific peer review and publication for epidemiologic findings.
153. A review of the legal status of epidemiologic data is found in Black & Lilienfeld,
Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 732 (1984).
154. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
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are the FOIA and the Privacy Act, and these statutes are nearly impossible to amend because of political constraints. 15 5 Legislative reform of
the medical data process depends on whether the patience, the money,
the lobbying talent, and the coalition for political support are available.
If not, a special amendment to the Public Health Service Act might be
1 6
an appropriate alternative solution. 5
There are some remedies short of statutory changes which may be
helpful. Interested users of medical data who wish to gather data
outside of government may read Forshamr15 7 and work with agencies to
set up depositories. If one wants access to the existing data of federal
agencies, negotiations can be attempted, and the agencies have considerable leeway to find exceptions to the privacy protections of the several statutes.1 8 In some cases, vigorous efforts may lead the government's lawyers to compromise allowing for access as was done with
some of the Reyes Syndrome material needed for products-liability litigation over aspirin. 5 9 Persistence is likely to be persuasive with the
government's lawyers, who will make the final strategic decisions on
which cases of statistical secrecy to defend.
XVII.

CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, those interested in medical research and those concerned about medical patient privacy must work out a statutory program of protections. Accommodation to today's confusion is not
enough. A better assurance to the individual medical patient about the
privacy of the contents of identifiable individual information is necessary. A more balanced, better-coordinated legislative package for epidemiologic research use of personal medical records will be necessary.
The constituency for changes to privacy law has yet to be formed, but
as more attention is paid to institutional sharing of medical records
with government agencies, more attention to privacy concerns is likely

155. Political resistance to reform of the FOIA has made amendments unsuccessful in each
session of Congress since 1979, but the effort has continued. See S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1985).
156. An amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) might be most appropriate, defining the
scope of protection to be accorded when personal medical records are inspected or abstracted by
the federal agencies such as the CDC.
157. 445 U.S. at 169. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
158. An agency need not cite an exemption since the FOIA's exemptions are permissive. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982); see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See generally I J.
O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 9.05 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
159. With the government's consent, a limited access compromise permitting epidemiologic
researchers representing private manufacturers of aspirin were allowed to examine the data underlying the federal CDC study of aspirin and the state studies of the much-debated linkage of aspirin and Reyes Syndrome. Bunch v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 6442 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery
County by
Dec.
16, 1985). 1986
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to be heard.
Looking back at the challenges faced by the Marquess of Queensberry in the nineteenth century, we can only conclude that our society
needs some source of respectable regulatory imposition of rules about
privacy. We could benefit from a more civilized form of individual
competition over privacy issues. In the longer term, a centrally coordinated federal privacy administrator appears most appropriate. The
Marquess proved that it is not enough to invent a better set of rules but
that reformers must also develop the stamina, footwork, and fortitude
to successfully develop a coherent and workable medical data sharing
system for the twenty-first century.
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